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BLIC EMPLOYMENT 
ELATIONS BOARD 
Vol. 9, No. 3 March 1976 
#2-5/25/7 .6 
ANNUAL REPORT EDITION 
1973 
NEGOTIATING EXPERIENCE 
2v500xoTitracls~ —-—-'—-'•• '--"— -
1.750-70% settled without third-
partv assistance 
743-30% brought to PERB fqr 
assistance 
Of 743 brought to PERB 
528 Schools 
215 Other governments 
Of 801 cases closed during 1973 
About 54% (433) settled by 
mediation 
About 45%(358) went to fact-
finding 
Of 358 cases going to fact-finding 
28% Settled by mediation during 
fact-finding 
..».«% Report accepted 
""We Report modified before 
P settlement 
REPRESENTATION 
128 Petitions received 
19 Director's decisions 
10 Board decisions 
47 Board certifications 
78 Petitions withdrawn 
46 Elections involving 7,799 
employees 
IMPROPER PRACTICES 
1 11 Cases pending at beginning of 
vear 
307 Charges filed 
38 Board decisions 
280 Charges settled by agreement 
100 Cases pending at end of year 
MANAGEMENT/CONFIDENTIAL 
31 Cases pending at beginning of year 
48 Applications received 
34 Director's decisions 
7 Board decisions 
16 Withdrawn after conference 
23 Cases pending at end of year 
WORK STOPPAGES 
18 Strikes 
6.370 Emplovees involved 
"
,
'
7
.106 Man-days idle 
;0I2% Percentage of Estimated 
•- J Working Time 
14 Board decisions on dues forfeiture 
1974 
NEGOTIATING EXPERIENCE 
2,600 Contracts, ______ 
1;800-70% settled"withouTthird-" 
party assistance 
788-30% brought to PERB for 
""assistance 
Of 788 brought to PERB 
493 Schools 
295 Other Governments 
Of 711 Cases Closed during 1974 
About 46% (325) settled by 
mediation 
About 54%. (381) went to fact-
finding 
Of 381 Cases going to fact-finding 
35%, Settled by mediation during 
fact-finding 
34% Report accepted 
31 % Report modified before 
settlement 
REPRESENTATION 
160 Petitions received 
33 Director's decisions 
12 Board decisions 
49T3oard certifications 
72 Petitions withdrawn 
41 Elections involving .13,728 
employees 
IMPROPER PRACTICES 
100 Cases pending at beginning of 
year 
352 Charges filed 
40 Hearing officer decisions 
30 Board decisions 
296 Charges settled by agreement 
129 Cases pending at end of year 
MANAGEMENT/CONFIDENTIAL 
23 Cases pending at beginning of year 
33 Applications received 
21 Director's decisions 
.0 Board decisions (No Appeals to Board) 
20 Withdrawn after.conference 
15 Cases pending at end of year 
WORK STOPPAGES 
* 16 Strikes 
4,100 Employees involved 
19.300 Man-days idle 
0.01% Percentage of Estimated 
Working Time Lost 
1 I Board decisions on dues forfeiture 
1975 
NEGOTIATING EXPERIENCE 
2,900 negotiating units 
"l;900;contractS"expiring~-:-^""-:- ————— — 
928 - 49% settled without third party assistance 
972 - 5 1 % brought to PERB for assistance 
Of 972 brought to PERB 
656 Schools 
316 Other Governments 
Of 892 Cases Closed during 1975 
About 31% (272) settled by mediation 
About 68% (605) went to fact-finding 
About 2% (15) closed by arbitration 
Of 605 Cases going to fact-finding 
40% Settled by mediation during fact-finding 
20% Report accepted 
40% Report modified before settlement 
(Includes 11% settled by post fact-finding 
conciliation) 
REPRESENTATION 
141 Petitions received 
46 Director's decisions 
16 Board decisions 
. 67 Board certifications 
45 Petitions withdrawn 
60 Elections involving 48,420 employees 
IMPROPER PRACTICES 
129 Cases pending at beginning of year 
541 Charges filed 
46 Hearing officer decisions 
26 Board decisions 
373 Charges settled by agreement 
245 Cases pending at end of year 
MANAGEMENT/ CONFIDENTIAL 
15 Cases pending at beginning of year 
45 Applications received 
16 Director's decisions 
1 Board decision (No appeals to Board) 
13 Withdrawn after conference 
31 Cases pending at end of year 
WORK STOPPAGES 
3 2 Strikes 
277,745 Employees involved 
2394,413 Man-days idle 
0.17% Percentage of Estimated Working Time 
Lost 
21 Board decisions on dues forfeiture 
•Does not include a 3-day strike of approximately 6,000 custodial workers under contract with the New York City Board of Education whose status as 
public employees is the subject of litigation, 
includes 63,000 New York City teachers, aides and paraprofessionals who participated in a 5-day strike. 
Last year was a time of crisis in collective bargaining for 
public employees throughout the country, and likewise in 
New York State. A new dimension came on the scene — 
an economic crisis so severe that it resulted in serious 
government retrenchment and increasing taxpayer 
resistance. 
Public employees, government and the citizenry all 
found themselves caught in a fiscal web; government was 
hard pressed to provide necessary and worthwhile services, 
and many, in response to their taxpayers, initiated lay-
offs. 
""~Tt~Was rn"thris~a"tmosphere^th"arthe"Public"ETriployment~ 
Relations Board sought to carry out its mission under the 
Taylor Law "to promote harmonious and cooperative 
relationships between government and its employees and 
to protect the public by assuring, at all times, the orderly 
and uninterrupted operations and functions of government 
It is not too surprising, then, in this troubled climate 
that PERB's caseload in contract disputes, improper 
practice cases and representation petitions increased 
significantly or that the number of strikes, particularly in 
school districts, rose substantially during the year. 
In addition to the economic situation, there were two 
major court decisions which had a serious impact on 
PERB's role in the collective bargaining arena. One 
upheld the constitutionality of the binding arbitration 
section of the Law in impasses involving police and 
firefighters (Amsterdam) .and the other limited PERB's 
power to provide remedies in improper practice cases 
(Jefferson County). Both these decisions will be discussed 
later in the report. 
It would appear, then, that intense negotiations 
problems occasioned by the fiscal dilemma have been the 
theme for 1975. 
CHANGES IN THE LAW 
Only one amendment to the Taylor Law was enacted by 
the 1975 Legislature. The amendment added BOCES 
districts, community colleges and the State University to 
the employers who may not conduct legislative hearings 
and take subsequent action as the final step in resolving 
impasses. (In 1974 school district employees were the only 
ones so affected.) 
The Legislature also clarified the legislative intent 
relating to the definition of managerial and confidential 
public employees which is discussed in the Mana-
gerial/Confidential Section of this report. 
CONCILIATION 
The troubled economy reflected itself in the substantial 
increase in caseload for the Conciliation Section during 
1975. The number of impasses rose from 788 in 1974 to 
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972, an increase of 23%. These statistics do not b y ^ 
themselves reflect the extremely difficult negotiation?',*' '% 
which characterized the year. The pressures of inflation" 
upon both government employers and public employees 
caused protracted negotiations which required the util-
ization of substantially more fact-finding and post fact-
finding conciliation than ever before. Because many 
impasses went directly to fact-finding, the fact-finding 
caseload rose from 381 in 1974 to 605 in 1975, and post 
fact-finding/conciliation from 55 in 1974 to 69 in 1975. 
Inevitably, with the economic pressures on both parties 
i:heTe-~also-was--a--substo 
There were 32 strikes in 1975 as against 16 strikes in 1974. 
In examining the PERB concilation experience it is 
important to recognize that the statute now provides for 
three different impasse procedures for various 
classifications of public employees. One covers edu-
cational personnel, a second, police and firefighters, and a 
third, all other state and local government employees. 
In the education area, following the removal of the 
legislative hearing and subsequent action by the legislative 
body as the final step in the procedures, PERB has 
ongoing responsibility for conciliation activities to 
"provide such assistance as may be appropriate." If the 
fact-finding report is rejected in whole or in part by either 
party, the PERB Conciliation Office utilizes a variety of 
procedures including the convening of meetings in various-*'' 
forms, post fact-finding conciliation and other technique^ ] 
to assist the parties to reach agreement. s*~"' 
In police and firefighter disputes final resolution is the 
submission of the issues to tripartite arbitration if 
mediation and fact-finding fail to bring about settlement.. 
All other public employees still are subject to legislative 
hearing and subsequent action by the legislative body as 
the final impasse step should mediation and fact-finding 
fail to bring about agreement. 
Education Employees 
As previously noted, there was a substantial increase in 
the number of work stoppages during calendar 1975 and 
twenty of the tthirty-twoe strikes involved teachers. The 
longest strike took place in Nyack and lasted 28 days. 
Negotiations in school districts differed dramatically in 
1975 because of the desire on the part of school boards to 
bring to the bargaining table substantial demands of their 
own in connection with contract proposals. This had not 
been characteristic of school district negotiations in 
previous years and again probably reflects dollar 
shortages, inflationary pressures and strong taxpayer 
protest. 
Apart from salary issues the major issues on the 
bargaining table between school boards and teachers were 
matters involving job security and "fair dismissal" • 
questions. A substantial surplus of teachers in the Iaboiu j 
market and the high rate of unemployment among 
professionals, especially teachers, brought job security 
issues to the fore. 
Police and Firefighters 
The amendment implementing compulsory interest 
arbitration for police and firefighter impasses took effect 
on July 1, 1974. The constitutionality of this amendment 
' ,.,^was challenged and was ultimately upheld in New York's 
/ ^Court of Appeals.Court decisions are discussed later in this 
'•*• ..^report. 
In the six months of 1974, PERB received ten (10) 
compulsory interest arbitration petitions and designated 
four (4) panels. In 1975, forty-five (45) petitions were 
received and 41 panels designated. An increase of almost 
50% is expected for 1976. PERB anticipated that the 
arbitration amendment would in its first and second years 
be heavily utilized and would probably have some effect 
on the ability to obtain agreements at the earlier stages of 
. .--^.co.nciliationdiiediatio.n„andjac.t-finding.-lt-was~anticipated^ 
the parties would "test the arbitration tool" and see what 
kind of results would be obtained. There were 67 
firefighter contract negotiations; 40 were' settled "at the 
bargaining table without PERB assistance; four were 
settled through PERB mediation, 13 through fact-finding 
and 10 by arbitration. In the 129 police negotiations 50 
were settled without PERB assistance, 25 through 
mediation, 33 through fact-finding and 21 by arbitration. 
The awards relied heavily on the fact finders' 
recommendations and the statutory criteria set forth in the 
Taylor Law.. 
This arbitration procedure is a three-year statutory 
experiment and expires on July 1, 1977 unless the 
Legislature extends or modifies it. The experience of 
^dispute settlement under the procedure will be carefully 
l~' '^studied, analyzed and reported to the Legislature in the 
iv
—-^ coming year. 
PERB is cooperating in a two-year study of the impact 
of this change in the impasse procedures. The research 
project, which inc ludes an analysis of experience both 
before and after enactment of the amendment, is being 
carried out under a grant from the National Science 
Foundation under the direction of Thomas A. Kochan, 
assistant professor at the New York State School of 
Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University. The 
report is expected to be completed in the fall of 1976. 
Preliminary studies of the arbitration procedure indicate 
that it is not overused, that the arbitration awards are 
averaging slightly less than negotiated agreements and that 
the existence of the arbitration procedures has generally 
not discouraged or chilled the collective bargaining 
between the parties. 
All Other Public Employees 
- For-those -p-ublic-rempl6yees-hdt4h--thV"-ed'ucMoTr-field-
or under the police/firefighter arbitration procedure, 208 
impasses were brought to PERB. Of these, 113 were 
settled through mediation, 57 through fact-finding, 6 in 
post fact-finding conciliation and about 20 went to 
legislative hearing. 
The dispute receiving most attention was that 
involving about 140,000 employees in four of the 
bargaining units of the State of New York. A three-man 
fact-finding panel recommended to the parties (CSEA & 
NYS) a wage increase of 6% as well as a variety of other 
recommendations. The Governor rejected the fact-finding 
report with regard to the salary increase indicating that 
the fiscal restraints of the State did not permit a salary 
increase and recommended instead a $250 one time "bonus 
payment" for state employees. The State Legislature, after 
hearings by a joint Senate/ Assembly Committee, accepted 
the Governor's recommendations and adopted the $250 
bonus. 
MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION 
September 1,1967 thru December 31,197S 
A) Total Cases Open 
During the Period 
Impasses Rec. During Period 
Total Closed During Period 
1975 
1238 
972 
892 
Closed as % of Open 72.1% 
(as of Dec. 31st) 
B) Method of Closing Cases: 
Mediation 
Fact-Finding 
Closed for Other Reasons 
Arbitration 
C) Closed by Fact-Finding 
Report Accepted 
No Report Issued 
/' Report Modified 
272 
605 
9-
6 
605 
122 
242 
241 
1974 
954 
788 
711 
74.5% 
325 
381 
5 
381 
128 
134 
119 
1973 
935 
743 
801 
85.7% 
433 
358 
10 
358 
106 
100 
152 
1972 
992 
839 
828 
83.5% 
349 
468 
11 
468 
117 
167 
184 
1971 
909 
755 
777 
85.5% 
374 
385 
18 
385 
115 
91 
179 
1970 
758 
696 
630 
83.1% 
366 
252 
12 
252 
81 
69 
102 
1969 
707 
642 
659 
93.2% 
323 
328 
8 
328 
107 
51 
170 
1968 
429 
416 
364 
84.8% 
212 
133 
19 
133 
58 
29 
46 
1967 
23 
23 
10 
43.5% 
5 
1 
4 
1 
-
1 
-
Total 
6018* 
5874 
5672 
94.3% 
2659 (46.9%) 
2911(51.3%) 
96(1.7%) 
6UL1%) 
2911 (100%) 
834 (28.6%) 
884 (30.4%) 
1193(41.0%) 
*Total number of cases received and re-opened during the entire period Sptember 1, 1967-December 31, 1974. The 
figures for each individual year are not additive since there was a carry-over each year after 1967 of cases received, but 
not closed, in the previous year. 
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GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION 
PERB is the designated agency for the empaneling of 
arbitrators in grievance disputes in a number of contracts 
across the state. Many other contracts utilize other 
arbitration agencies or arbitrator appointment procedures 
agreed upon by the parties. 
In 1974,- grievance arbitration cases under the aegis of 
PERB equaled 179, a 21% increase over the previous year; 
in 1975, there were 257, or a 43.6% increase over 1974. 
IMPROPER PRACTICES 
The number of improper labor practice charges brought 
to. PERB during ^calendar J 975 rose nearly, 54% over the 
previous year. Nearly 90% of the charges were either 
settled or withdrawn without the necessity of action by 
the Board. 
Negotiating in Good Faith 
The Court of Appeals decision in Jefferson, which is 
discussed in a later section of this report, limits PERB's 
remedial authority in case of a finding of failure to 
negotiate in good faith. In Croton-Harmon, the issue 
before the hearing officer was whether the employer had 
failed to negotiate in good faith by refusing to execute a 
contract and by unilaterally removing certain positions 
from the unit and reducing their pay. The employer 
argued that the reallocations had been agreed to by the 
union. The hearing officer found to the contrary and 
sustained the subsection (d) violation concerning failure to 
negotiate in good faith. Relying upon the same facts 
which evidenced the subsection (d) violation, he went on 
and found: 
"(t)hese circumstances certainly call for an explanation as 
to why the (employer) felt compelled to act at that precise : 
time, but none was offered. The only inference to be drawn 
from this is that the (employer) intended to present to (the 
union) and the employees a fait accompli making clear 
that ... further attempt to exercise statutory rights would 
be futile. These actions, in derogation of the rights of (the 
union) and the rights of the members of the negotiating 
unit to its representation are so inherently destructive of 
such rights that the (employer) must be presumed to have 
that as its purpose." 
Thus, finding a violation of subsection (a) and (d), his 
order required the employer not only to make the 
employees whole but to sign the contract. 
In Greenwich, the parties appeared to have reached 
agreement on a complex salary formula; however, when it 
was reduced to contractual language, each side had a 
different understanding of the meaning of one of the key 
factors in the formula. Crediting the conflicting testimony 
of both parties' chief negotiators, the hearing officer 
concluded that no agreement had in fact been reached 
since there had not been a true meeting of the minds on 
the meaning and intent of the language. 
A hearing officer in another case, Tarrytowns, agreed 
with the employer's contention that it was not required to 
reopen negotiations once a memorandum of agreement 
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had been signed. The union's president and the 
Superintendent of Schools, after lengthy negotiations, had 
executed such a memorandum. However, before the draft 
of the formal contract was completed, the union sought 
further negotiations on a matter never before discussed. ^  
The hearing officer found that the memorandum "was the/H, 
culmination of lengthy negotiations" and represented "ari^-' 
exchange of mutual promises" between the parties and 
that it was "a binding contract" under the statutory 
definition of an "agreement." 
Triborough Doctrine 
During 1975, PERB had several occasions to reaffirm 
its "Triborough" doctrine under which it is an improper 
practice to unilaterally change mandatory terms and 
conditions of employment following expiration of a 
; :
--- -contract and-durm^^ •— 
for example, Rockland BOCES, which has been affirmed 
by the Appellate Division,.3rd Dept., Livingston BOCES, 
and Cattaraugus.) In Malone, the obligation to maintain 
the status quo was found by a majority of PERB to 
include the continuation of the parties' grievance/ar-
bitration procedure. 
Refusal to Negotiate in Good Faith 
Several "refusal to negotiate" cases concerned problems 
arising during the "reduce to writing" stage of 
negotiations. In Yonkers, a PERB majority, relying upon 
the credibility findings of the hearing officer, found that, 
as the union had expressly agreed to a new evaluation 
procedure, the contrary language of the prior contract had 
to be deleted from the new one. In his dissent, Member 
Fred L. Denson found that the agreed-upon language was*, 
ambiguous, and that its meaning was dependent upon its*/ ..' 
placement in the contract, which subject the parties had 
not discussed. Therefore, he would remand the matter for 
further negotiations as to its placement. 
One of the findings by PERB in City of New York was 
that the parties had reached agreement upon exact 
language for a new productivity provision. The union 
wanted PERB to rule further that the new language 
implicitly superseded certain "old" language and that the 
latter had to be omitted from the new contract. The 
ernployer contended that since the parties were negotiating 
on the basis that all provisions of the old contract were to 
be carried forward unless expressly deleted, and as there 
was no mention of the "old" provision in their 
negotiations, there was no meeting of the minds and no 
contract. PERB found that it did not have to resolve these 
additional issues, reasoning that the.question of how to 
reconcile the "old" with the "new" provisions, if 
reconciliation was necessary, was one of contract 
interpretation which should be resolved by the parties' 
grievance/arbitration procedure. 
Waiver 
The question of waiver has been litigated frequently 
before PERB and in 1975 two significant decisions were , 
rendered. In Port Washington, PERB made it clear thai./ 
not only can an express statement evidence a waiver but a-
waiver can also be established by a party's conscious 
acceptance of conduct by the other side or silence when it 
would reasonably have been expected- to speak out. In 
New York City School District, the issue was whether the 
employer's unilateral change of the compensation rate for 
per-session work, which was not referred to in the 
contract, was improper. PERB found merit in the 
employer's defense of waiver based upon a "matters not 
3*7 covered" clause. 
\ P Ratification Procedures 
In Putnam and Friendship, hearing officers found 
negotiators of the employer and the union to have 
respectively violated the Act when they repudiated their 
agreements and failed to seek ratification from their 
respective , principals. Thus, clearly spelled out is the 
reciprocal and affirmative duty of each side's negotiator to 
consider himself bound by the negotiated agreement he 
entered into on behalf of his principal and to seek its 
^ . ^ r a t i f i c a t i o n :.: •_.-: _._:_.:-_ :_:_L-:::~: .:_-.-.: ;_...—.. 
SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS 
During 1975, the Board ruled for the first time upon the 
negotiability of the following items.* Found to be 
mandatory subjects of negotiations were: 
Air conditioning in cars (Scarsdale) 
Discretionary discipline procedures (Scarsdale) 
Use of unsafe equipment (Scarsdale) 
These items were found to be non-mandatory subjects: 
Work schedule posting requirement affecting emergency 
call in (Scarsdale) 
Inclusion of statutory provision in contract (Scarsdale) 
Inclusion in contract of provision contrary to statutory 
mandate (Scarsdale) 
I "\ Organizational structure (Scarsdale) 
Removal of unsafe equipment from service (Scarsdale) 
Notification of results of criminal investigation of unit 
employees (Scarsdale) 
Exclusion of unit members from negotiating team (New 
Rochelle) 
Prohibition against consultation with unit employees 
(New Rochelle) 
New employees to furnish own tools (Nassau County) 
REPRESENTATION 
In this, PERB's eighth year, with initial uniting patterns 
already set, the focus of matters brought to PERB shifted 
to whether a previously established overall unit ought to 
be continued. In determining whether or not to fragment 
such a unit, "negotiating history" became a significant and 
at times determinative consideration. In the leading case of 
Smithtown, the petitioner sought to represent a separate 
blue collar unit while the employer, claiming 
administrative convenience, in conjunction with the 
incumbent negotiating agent, contended that the existing 
overall blue and white collar unit remained the "most 
appropriate unit." A PERB majority dismissed the 
• - : petition. Chairman~Robert DHrtelsb.y-and MemheiJLosep_h: 
]}R. Crowley observed that if they were now making the 
v 
*A full listing of mandatory and non-mandatory subjects 
• of negotiations, as determined by PERB and the Courts, is 
available upon request. 
initial uniting decision, the traditional differences in 
working conditions between the two "collars" and their 
presumably divergent negotiating goals and aspirations 
would warrant separate units. But, as the unit had been in 
existence for some seven years, they stated that they were 
now in a position to examine the actual negotiating 
compatability of the overall unit and did not have' to rely 
on speculation. On the record evidence they concluded 
that the "negotiating history" demonstrated that the blue 
and white collar employees had engaged in meaningful 
and effective negotiations. Further buttressing their 
conclusion was the fact that the blue collar employees 
constituted a majority of the overall unit and this 
diminished the likelihood that their interests had been or 
would be sacrificed. In his dissent, Member Fred L. 
Denson expressed concern that the-emphasis being placed 
on negotiating history might encourage a group of 
employees intent upon documenting a claim of 
"disharmony" to disrupt negotiations deliberately. It has 
been made clear in a number of decisions following 
Smithtown "that a long standing history of meaningful 
and effective negotiations, as demanded by Smithtown, is. 
a predicate to the continuation of an overall unit." 
(Madison). 
In Clinton, where the petitioner sought a separate unit 
of deputy sheriffs, the issue was whether a joint employer 
relationship required the fragmentation of a multi-
employer unit into a separate unit of county employees 
and another for employees of the county and the sheriff. 
The Director determined that the joint employer 
relationship does not, a fortiori, dictate fragmentation; 
rather, it is a factor to be considered in determining 
whether the at issue employees can engage in meaningful 
and effective negotiations in an overall unit. The Clinton 
County sheriff had been a participant in negotiations as a 
member of the county's negotiating team and he was also 
a signatory of the county-union contract in the existing 
unit. The key finding of the Director was that over the 
years the sheriff, although vested with such power by 
statute, had not seen fit to exercise independent control 
over labor relations for his deputies and in practice viewed 
himself as an appointed department head. Then, applying 
the Smithtown tests for unit fragmentation, the Director 
concluded that a separate unit of deputies was not 
warranted. The Director's decision has not been appealed 
to PERB. 
The appropriateness of a separate unit of physician 
interns and residents was at issue in County of Erie (E.J. 
Meyer Memorial Hospital). In this case, the petitioner 
sought to fragment a county-wide white collar unit and to 
represent only those physicians located at the hospital and 
then in internship or residency. The Director dismissed the 
petition as seeking too narrow a unit, in a subsequent 
appeal to the Board, PERB decided that interns and 
residents were both students and employees. The unique 
employment characteristic, among other factors 
::e^nsideie4^^by:::i:the::::"Boa;rdr - warranted :ia--~sepMa:t:e: 
negotiating unit. 
Another novel issue — whether a legislative 
determination should be treated as a bar to a petition — 
was considered in another County of Erie case. The 
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Director apparently agreed with the concept of a 
"legislative bar," but observed that a legislative 
determination would have to finalize all of the substantial 
terms and conditions of employment at impasse before it 
could be treated as the equivalent of a one-year contract. 
As the at issue legislative determination only addressed 
itself to a few of the matters still in dispute and left many 
items "open," he found the petition was timely. 
Subsequent to this interim decision, the parties reached 
agreement on the unit in dispute. 
ELECTIONS 
Included within the 60 elections conducted by PERB in 
1975 were three mail ballot elections; one for State 
"employees" w'fffiin"the"pTofeTsiOTal,"scfemfc 
services unit (40,000 employees), another for the trooper 
unit of the New York State Division of State PQliae_C3.,2Q0._._ 
employees), and, the last for a small unit of adult 
education teachers in Great Neck. Other than in the P.S. 
& T unit election (57%), the percentage of voter 
participation in 1975, whether by mail or in person 
election, remained at about the same level as in prior years 
(78% in 1975 as to 75% in 1974). 
PERB's rules permit certification without an election to 
determine majority status, if there is only one employee 
organization seeking to represent the unit. In one case, 
Clarkstown, an employer sought to eliminate the 
possibility of certification without an election by 
contending that an in-person election should be held 
between the organization seeking to represent the 
employees as well as the previous negotiating agent. 
Inasmuch as the prior representative had disclaimed any 
interest in continuing its representation, the Director 
found the employer's contention to be without merit and 
proceeded with certification without election. 
Showing of Interest 
The language of the rule providing for certification 
without an election refers to dues deduction authorization 
cards. In Islip, this reference was found by PERB to be 
merely illustrative of the type of evidence which may be 
considered in. determining majority status; individual 
signatures on a petition also are acceptable. In this same 
case PERB made clear its intent to protect the secrecy of 
the employees' preference by not permitting the employer 
to examine these evidences; their authenticity is for PERB 
to determine. Applying the same rationale, the Director in 
another case (PBA of New York State Police) ruled that 
neither an employer nor a competing employee 
organization would be permitted the opportunity to 
examine a "showing of interest." The Director's ruling that 
these evidences are "confidential" was recently confirmed 
by court decision. 
MANAGEMENT/CONFIDENTIAL 
School Administrators 
When the Taylor Law was amended in 1971 to provide 
for the designation of individuals as managerial or 
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confidential, the State Legislature issued a statement of 
intent that the statutory criteria were to be applied in light 
of a person's current representation status. As interpreted 
by PERB, this meant, for example, that principals and 
other school administrators in an existing unit were only 
to be designated if there was very clear evidence of their ; 
exercise of managerial or confidential responsibilities, with 4. 
all uncertainties resolved in favor of continued Taylor Law 
coverage. Conversely, those who had not previously 
exercised their rights under the Taylor Law were to be 
designated managerial or confidential in the absence of 
compelling evidence to the contrary. In 1975, a new 
legislative directive eliminated current representation 
status as a consideration in these matters. In effect, the 
directive raises the level of proof necessary to designate 
school administrators as managerial even if they had not • 
been previously placed in units. 
In the first case considered after the directive was issued, 
Copiague, certain unrepresented principals who previously 
had been designated as managerial sought a negotiating 
unit of their own. The record established that the 
employer consulted with them about their problems in 
administering the contract and in a general sense about the 
practical implications of certain negotiating proposals. 
Principals also attended some negotiating sessions but 
participated neither in caucuses nor table discussions; they 
were not present when salaries were discussed. In 
determining that the principals did not meet the criterion 
of individuals "Who may reasonably be required on behalf 
of the public employer to assist directly in the preparation 
for and conduct of collective negotiations," PERB 
concluded that the principals were observers or, at best, s< 
resource personnel, and not part of the decision-making ^ 
team and declared them entitled to representation. 
PERB also had occasion to analyze the type of "policy" 
•a person must "formulate" under the first statutory 
criterion in order to be found managerial. In Binghamton, 
a PERB majority of Chairman Helsby and Member 
Crowley held that the term "formulate policy" should be 
read in the broad sense as meaning matters relating to the 
employer's mission. In the case of a school district this 
refers to "educational policy." Member Denson, on the 
other hand, adopted the more restrictive view that only 
one who formulates labor relations policy should be 
denied representation rights. In light of this decision, six 
administrators were held to be management and 
confidential. 
THE TAYLOR LAW IN THE COURTS 
Thirty-six separate judicial proceedings involving PERB 
were instituted during 1975. in addition in other cases not 
involving PERB, several decisions were rendered which 
were of importance to the law of public employment 
relations under the Taylor Law. 
PERB's Remedial Power 
A major decision by the Court of Appeals concluded 
that PERB's power to fashion a remedy for violation of 
Section 209-a. 1(d) and Section 209-a.2(b) (refusals to 
negotiate) was severely limited by the provisions of 
Section 205.5(d) of the law. The Court held that while 
PERB had jurisdiction to determine that an employer's 
refusal to pay merit increments called for by its contract 
with an employee organization violated its Taylor Law 
duty to negotiate in good faith, PERB exceeded its powers 
/'/hen it ordered the employer to pay the increments. The 
\ /ourt of Appeals concluded that as the statute is presently 
written, PERB could do no more than direct the employer 
"to negotiate in good faith," Jefferson County Board of 
Supervisors v. PERB, et al. 
Enforcement 
Although the Court of Appeals stated that PERB may 
enter an order requiring an employer to negotiate in good 
faith, the Appellate Division, Second Department, has 
denied PERB's request for enforcement of such an order 
— 4n^a-xase^where-E£:RJB_.determinecL::that..a.-LScn.o.ol_distxiet.-. 
had violated its duty to negotiate in good faith when it 
refused to pay salary increments, Board of Cooperative 
Educational Services of Rockland County v. PERB, et al. 
In this case PERB had applied its so-called Triborough 
doctrine and found that, notwithstanding the fact that a 
collective agreement had expired, the school district was 
obligated to maintain the status quo by paying previously 
agreed upon salary increments. The Appellate Division's 
decision appears to be inconsistent in that it specifically 
confirms PERB's determination that the employer had 
engaged in an improper practice. Notwithstanding this 
conclusion, the court refused to giant PERB's request to 
enforce its direction "to negotiate in good faith." This 
decision has been appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
r Mandatory Subjects of Negotiation 
. * j In another decision, the courts confirmed a PERB 
"determination that certain issues were mandatory subjects 
of negotiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Appellate Division's decision in City of Albany v. PERB 
and Albany Police Officers Union, Local 2§41, which 
held that PERB was correct in concluding that retirement 
benefits, work rules and time off for union officials were 
mandatory subjects of negotiation. 
Status of Managerial Employees 
In another area, further clarification of PERB's power 
to define the status of managerial employees was obtained 
when the Appellate Division, Third Department, 
confirmed PERB's determination that certain supervisory 
employees of the Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority 
(foremen and dispatchers) were not managerial employees 
within' the meaning of the Taylor Law, Metropolitan 
Suburban Bus Authority v. PERB. The Court of Appeals 
denied leave to appeal. In its opinion the Appellate 
Division thoroughly examined the statute and PERB's 
decisions thereunder and concluded that PERB's 
interpretation of the statute was reasonable and its 
decision that the particular employees did not exercise a 
"major" role in contract and personnel administration, 
was supported by substantial evidence. . 
!i Police/Firefighter Arbitration 
~ The enactment of Section 209.4 of the Taylor Law 
establishing compulsory arbitration as the final step in 
negotiation disputes involving police and firemen spawned 
numerous lawsuits during the year. Two of the several 
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the statute 
reached the Court of Appeals where that court upheld the 
statute against several constitutional attacks. In particular 
the court rejected the argument that compulsory 
arbitration violated the Home Rule provisions of the State 
Constitution. In addition, the court rejected contentions 
that the Legislature had unconstitutionally delegated its 
legislative authority to the arbitration panel, that it had 
unconstitutionally granted the arbitration panel the power 
of taxation and that the statute violated the one man-one 
vote principle, City of Amsterdam v. Robert D.Helsby,et 
al. and City of Buffalo v. PERB. Another important issue 
under the arbitration statute is the proper method and 
scope of judicial review of arbitration awards. Civil 
Service Law Section 209.4 does not specifically deal with 
the question of judicial review. As a result differing 
decisions have"been-renderecTbyTlTe~~cl!mrt s~irTN e w T orkT™ 
Two decisions in cases in which PERB was a party, 
involving the City of Albany, have held that the 
appropriate procedure for review and enforcement of 
arbitration awards is pursuant to CPLR Article 75 and 
not CPLR Article 78. These cases have been argued in the 
Appellate Division, Third Department, and decision is 
pending. In decisions in Erie County and Nassau County, 
in which PERB was not a party, the courts have 
concluded that CPLR Article 78 is the appropriate vehicle 
for judicial review and that PERB is responsible for 
enforcement of such awards. In the Albany cases, PERB 
has taken the position that such awards are not orders of 
PERB and that the parties to the arbitration proceeding 
may utilize CPLR Article 75 for review or enforcement of 
the awards. 
Joint Employer 
In another area of concern the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division reversing a 
determination of PERB that the New York Public Library 
is a joint public employer with the City of New York. The 
court concluded that the Library is not a public employer 
nor a joint public employer within the meaning of the 
Taylor Law. 
Power to Reduce Work Force 
During the year several cases in which PERB was not a 
party dealt with the vital question of the power of a 
government to voluntarily agree in a collective agreement 
to limitation of its power to reduce its work force. The 
Court of Appeals in the Susquehanna Valley case held 
that although such a subject was not a mandatory subject 
of negotiations under the Taylor Law, it was a subject 
about which a government could voluntarily agree and if it 
did, it could be required to submit a dispute relating to 
such agreement to arbitration under a contractual 
arbitration provision. The court concluded that there is no 
statute, case law or public policy which limits the freedom 
of a government to contract concerning staff size. 
Notwithstanding this decision, the Appellate Division, 
Second Department, in a series of decisions has held that 
in the event of a fiscal emergency, a government may 
lawfully reduce staff size although it has by contract 
agreed not to do so. This issue will no doubt be-: resolved 
by the Court of Appeals in the near future. 
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IN THE COURTS 
Among the responsibilities of the Office of Counsel is 
the representation of the Board in all court proceedings. 
Of the 36 proceedings commenced by or against PERB 
during the year, 17 were closed. In addition, 17 other 
proceedings pending at the beginning of the year were 
closed. The number of court proceedings in 1975 
represented an increase of over 50% over.the previous 
years. The following are some of the cases closed during 
the year: 
New York Public Library v. PERB 
Court of Appeals rendered its decision during the past year holding 
that the Public Library was not a public employer or a joint employer 
with the City of New York. 
Jefferson^CountyTM.-oL^^ ____--_ ~ 
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision during the past year 
limiting PERB's remedial power in refusal to negotiate cases. 
City of Amsterdam v. PERB, et al. 
City of Buffalo v. PERB 
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision during the past year 
upholding the constitutionality of the police and firemen arbitration 
statute. 
Subsequent to the Court of Appeals decision, two cases involving the 
City of Corning and cases brought by the City of Ogdensburg, the 
Village of Johnson City, the City of Auburn and the City of Niagara 
Falls were all closed. 
Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority v. PERB 
PERB's decision that the Authority's supervisors were not managerial 
employees was affirmed by the Appellate Division. The Court of 
Appeals subsequently denied leave to appeal. 
Griffin v. PERB and Sheriff of Erie County 
1 his proceeding sought to review PERB's" decision that deputy sheriffs 
are not covered by the police arbitration statute. This case was 
discontinued upon the stipulation of the parties. 
NYC Board of Education v. PERB 
This proceeding sought to review PERB's decision that New York 
City principals are not managerial employees. This proceeding was 
discontinued upon stipulation of the parties. 
diFrancesca v. PERB, et al. 
This proceeding sought to enjoin PERB from hearing an improper 
practice charge. The Supreme Court denied the injunction. This 
proceeding may be considered closed. 
PERB -v. Board of Educ, Town of Hempstead 
PERB sought and obtained an order enforcing two improper practice 
orders directed against the Hempstead School District. No appeal was 
taken. 
Middle Island School District v. Middle Island Teachers Assn. and 
PERB 
This was an attempt to stay PERB from hearing an improper practice 
charge. Supreme Court dismissed the petition. No appeal was taken. 
City of Albany v. PERB, et al. (2 cases) 
Proceeding to review PERB's scope of negotiations decisions 
involving Albany policemen and firemen. The Supreme Court's decision 
annulling PERB's determination was reversed by the Appellate Division 
and PERB's decision confirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Appellate Division's decision. 
Ferrato v. Wilson and PERB 
This action in U.S. District Court sought to challenge PERB's 
Security Services Unit determination on federal constitutional grounds. 
The case was dismissed by the District Court. On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the Third District affirmed without opinion and awarded 
double costs. No further appeal was taken. 
Joseph L. Benedetto v. PERB 
The petitioner sought to review a decision rejecting his claim that his 
dismissal constituted an improper practice. After the Appellate Division 
confirmed PERB's decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal. 
City of Coming v. PERB, et al. 
This petition sought to challenge the naming of a neutral arbitrator 
under the arbitration statute. The petition was dismissed by the Supreme 
Court. Steuben County. 
City of Corning v. PERB, et al. 
This was a companion proceeding to the above dealing with other 
issues under the arbitration statute. This petition was also dismissed. 
Hornell City School Dist. v. Hornell Teachers Assn. and PERB 
This action sought to enjoin PERB from hearing an improper practice 
charge. Supreme Court, Steuben County dismissed the petition. 
Yonkers Federation of Teachers v. PERB, et al. 
This proceeding sought to review an improper practice decision (U-
.1308 & U-1311). Supreme Court, Albany County dismissed the petiticS^v, 
and later denied reargument. No appeal was taken. J 
Richard Vizzini (Uniformed Firefighters Assn., Local 94) v. PERB 
This petition sought to stay the holding of an improper practice 
proceeding. Supreme Court, New York County dismissed the petition. 
City of New York (Office of Labor Relations) v. PERB 
This proceeding sought to review an improper practice decision (U-
1167 & U-1178). Proceeding was discontinued upon stipulation of the 
parties. 
Buffalo PBA v. City of Buffalo and PERB 
Supreme Court, Erie County, held that enforcement of an arbitration 
award could only be sought by PERB. PERB was granted intervention 
as a party on the appeal to the Appellate Division. The case was 
subsequently rendered moot after the City complied with the award. 
™"QgaensbWgl»BAJv::City o t O ^ 
This was a petition to review an arbitration award. PERB moved to 
drop PERB as a party. This motion was granted by Judge Shea (St. 
Lawrence County). The judge initially also dismissed the petition but on 
reargument Judge Shea found the award to be arbitrary or capricious 
and remanded it to the arbitration panel for further consideration. 
PERB is no longer a party in the case. Apparently no appeal has been 
taken. 
Town of Wallkill Unit CSEA v. Town of Wallkill 
PERB appeared as amicus to argue that PERB jurisdiction does not 
bar arbitration of a grievance. Supreme Court, Westchester County, 
agreed with this position and granted an order compelling arbitration. 
The Town appealed to the Appellate Division. We do not contemplate 
filing an amicus brief in the Appellate Division. 
Town of Orangetown v. PERB 
Proceeding to review an improper practice decision (U-1052 and U-
1130). PERB's motion to dismiss as premature was granted. No appeal 
was taken. 
City of Albany and Albany Police Officers Union and PERB 
This was a motion by the City of Albany to quash a subpoena issued,^ 
by the APOU attorney in a PERB improper practice case. Afte|""l 
argument the request was withdrawn. 
City of Albany, Council 66, AFSCME and PERB 
This was another motion by the City to quash subpoenas issued in a 
PERB improper practice case. After argument, Supreme Court, Albany 
County, denied the motion and directed compliance. 
N.Y.S. Police Benevolent Assn. v. PERB, et al. 
This proceeding sought to enjoin an election in the State Police unit 
on grounds of failure to provide petitioner with evidence of a showing of . 
interest. Supreme Court, Albany County, dismissed the PBA petition. 
No appeal was taken. 
Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth. Sergeants & Lieutenants Assn. v. 
George Roukis and PERB, et al. 
This proceeding sought to enjoin the holding of a fact-finding hearing.. 
After argument, Supreme Court, Kings County denied a stay and 
dismissed the petition. 
City of Hornell v. PERB 
This was a proceeding to review an arbitration award. Supreme 
Court, St. Lawrence County granted PERB's motion to drop PERB as a 
party. 
Auburn Firefighters Assn. v. City of Auburn and PERB 
These proceedings sought to enforce and annul an arbitration award. 
The parties have reached a settlement and the case will be discontinued. 
STRIKES 
There was a total of 32 strikes in 1975. During this 
period, the Office of Counsel issued 20 charges against 
employee organizations for violations of the Taylor Law 
strike prohibition. In addition, five charges were issued by , 
chief legal officers, as is authorized by the Taylow Lav!1,/; 
Counsel's Office investigated four other apparent strikes''"' 
but no charges were issued. The Board rendered decisions 
in 22 strike proceedings assessing penalties ranging from 
three months suspension to indefinite suspensions in the 
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case of employee organizations previously penalized for an 
earlier strike violation. In one case, the Board directed no 
forfeiture of dues deduction rights upon a finding of 
extreme provocation by the employer. 
Of 34 Mini-PERBs previously approved by PERB, only 
13 are now in existence. During 1975, two Mini-
PERBs, the Village of Port Chester and the Village of 
Valley Stream, were terminated by the respective local 
governments. Three petitions were filed with PERB 
alleging that determinations or conduct of the Mini-
PERBs were not in substantial compliance with the 
requirements of the Taylor Law. These petitions were 
"in v~esfig¥te^ ~ b ^ PERB's rules. 
In two, PERB dismissed the petitions; one is still pending. 
RESEARCH 
PERB's research responsibilities, as defined by statute 
include; compiling data on wages and fringe benefits and 
other conditions of employment in the public sector, 
serving as a clearinghouse for such information for the 
economy as a whole, and undertaking special studies as 
needed concerned with problems in the administration of 
the Law. 
Reporting of current settlements was expanded during 
1975. Previously, public reporting of settlements had been 
confined to teacher disputes and only overall averages 
were reported. Teacher contracts negotiated in 1975 
resulted in an average increase of 6.5 percent in salary 
schedules statewide, 6.2 percent upstate, and 7.7 percent 
downstate (suburban New York City counties). Excluding 
fire and police, local government employees averaged 7.7 
percent. Increases in new police contracts averaged 9.7 
percent, 10.3 percent for negotiated settlements, 8.7 
percent for arbitration awards. Firefighter increases 
averaged 7.4 percent; 8.1 percent where the settlement was 
negotiated and 6.7 percent for arbitration awards. 
Current settlements are now reported in PERB News as 
space permits. From time to time trend data on public 
sector-settlements will be-publishe"d7prbbably aT"t"he"end~of"" 
the third and fourth quarters. Public sector employment 
constitutes one sixth of total employment nationally; 
however, no current settlement data are systematically 
reported for this sector of the economy. 
PERB publishes reports on union wages and fringe 
benefits for various types of public employees in New 
York State. These reports are compiled from contracts on 
file and inquiries made to the parties to verify analysis of 
contracts. Wages and salary reports normally summarize 
pay schedules. Fringe benefit reports give data on 
retirement plans, health insurance, sick and illness leave 
benefits, vacation and holiday policies, and other benefits. 
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AUTHORIZED STAFFING 
TO 
61 61 63 
6* 64 
55 
58 
45 
1961-68 I96B-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72. I97Z.-75 1973-7+ I97V7S 1975-76 
*In January 1976, authorized staffing was reduced to 59* 
These reports are updated periodically, usually at the 
conclusion of the applicable negotiating cycle, so that 
revised data becomes available at the beginning of or early 
in the next cycle. When new developments or trends are 
dictated, special reports are prepared or existing reports 
are revised to incorporate such new developments. 
The following reports were published: 
Wages and salaries. Police (city, county, town, and 
village) firefighters, deputy sheriff, city blue collar, city 
clerical, county probation officer, county nurses, county 
blue collar, county clerical. 
Fringe benefits. City general employees, police, county 
employees including sheriffs and medical personnel, fringe 
benefits for non-institutional school personnel (revised 
biannually). 
Other. Community colleges — salaries, fringe benefits, 
and related practices. 
Data are furnished to both advocates and neutrals in 
preparation for and devising the positions in negotiations 
upon direct inquiry.' Information supplied upon direct 
request normally comes from contract files. An attempt is 
made to collect on a timely basis all public sector labor 
contracts. These files are open to the public and are used 
extensively by labor and management representatives as 
well as labor relations specialists from the . acader-... 
community. Within the constraints of staff, budge',;^--;1:^, 
time, copies of contracts are made available. / 
PUBLIC RELATIONS 
The impact of settlements in the public sector and their 
effect on the economy and the reaction of government and 
the populace have kept the Taylor Law in the forefront of 
the news throughout the year. PERB, its staff and its 
Panel of Mediators and Fact Finders have had more 
visability in the newspapers, radio and television than any 
year since the initial years when PERB was beginning to 
function! v~ 
The State Board has endeavored to communicate to the 
public and to its clientele as much information as possible 
on the Law, any changes and how these affect day-to-day 
operations, decisions and .various data from its resource 
files. 
This information was disseminated through the monthly 
PERB News, three basic guides to the Law — the Taylor 
Law, Rules of Procedure and What Is the Taylor Law — 
And How Does It Work?, and a compilation of Official 
Decisions, Opinions and Related Matters. 
Several seminars were initiated by PERB with the 
cooperation of community colleges and the New York 
State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Come!,'.... 
The community college programs were designed to u&ffM-f/ 
information on the Law for both managemer':-'';;adk'-
employee groups, while the ILR School seminars pi Set 
date on new developments for the members of P 0p. . 
various panels. J\S;/;;; 
RULES OF PROCEDURE 
Several amendments were promulgated by PERB to its 
Rules governing access to records of the Board. The major 
change dealt with a method of appeal from denial of a 
request for access to records or a failure to provide access 
to records within five working days after receipt of a 
request. Other minor changes dealt with salary records. 
The changes in the rules were effective on March 1, 1975. 
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CASE NO. U-1723 
This matter comes to us upon the exceptions of the City of New 
York (City) and the cross-exceptions of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association 
of the City of New York, Inc. (PBA) to a decision of a hearing officer issued 
on January 15, 1976. The charge in this case filed by PBA on August 1, 1975 
alleged that since April 3, 1975 the City had refused to negotiate in good 
faith on the subject of "duty charts" in violation of CSL Section 209-a.l(d) 
in that the City had engaged in surface bargaining, failed and refused to 
furnish information, declared impasse prematurely and declared that certain 
aspects of the duty charts are non-mandatory subjects of negotiation. Among 
the defenses raised by the City was the allegation that those matters about 
which it declined to negotiate on the ground that they were non-mandatory 
subjects of negotiation were, in fact, not mandatory subjects of negotiation. 
The hearing officer decided in favor of PBA on the scope of negotiations issues. 
Reasoning that the allegations of surface bargaining and refusal to furnish 
information were related, he determined that, on these charges, too, the City 
was in violation. Finally, he determined that the evidence did not substanti-
ate the allegation that the City's declaration of an impasse was premature. 
Board - U-1723 -2 
The City excepted from so much of the hearing officer's decision 
as found that it was in violation of CSL Section 209-a.l(d) and PBA excepted 
to that part of the decision that dismissed its charge that the City declared 
impasse prematurely. The New York City Office of Collective Bargaining sought 
and obtained permission to intervene in the appeal from the hearing officer's 
determination. Such intervention was restricted to jurisdictional issues. On 
these issues, OCB is allied in interest with the City. 
At the time of the hearing officer's decision, the impasse between 
the City and PBA was before an impasse panel appointed by OCB pursuant to 
Section 1173.7-0 of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law. Upon the 
consent of both parties, and because of their desire for a quick resolution of 
the issues so as to facilitate the continuance of negotiations and/or procedures 
1 
before the impasse panel, we waived the filing of written exceptions and held 
oral argument on January 27, 1976, at which time the parties stated the nature 
of their exceptions. They also presented oral arguments, a record of which was 
kept in lieu of written briefs. OCB, however, availed itself of an opportunity 
to file a written brief three days later. PBA objected to our consideration of 
that brief on the ground that it dealt with matters other than the jurisdic-
tional issue for which it was permitted to intervene. We sustain this objec-
tion of PBA. In reaching our determination, we have considered the oral argu-
ments of the three parties, the written briefs of the two primary parties to 
the hearing officer, OCB's written brief as it applies to jurisdictional issues 
only, and OCB's position on substantive matters as stated in OCB decisions, 
most notably, Decision B-24-75. 
1 On January 30, 1976, we issued an Interim Decision indicating that we did 
not deem the continuation of impasse panel proceedings to be inconsistent 
with the determination of the hearing officer. 
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FACTS 
The facts are set out in detail in the hearing officer's report. 
As we confirm his findings of fact, it is unnecessary to restate them all. 
We do, however, state those facts that are essential to our resolution of that 
issue which is most critical to the parties — whether the refusal of the City 
to negotiate over certain demands on the ground that those demands did not 
"involve" mandatory "s~ub~je"cts" of negotiation" was a violation: o"f"~its duty "to~ ~ ~ 
negotiate in good faith under the Taylor Law. The unresolved negotiation 
demands involve duty charts. Duty charts reduce to diagram form the working 
schedules of police officers for the calendar year. Most police officers work 
on a rotating, three-platoon (shift) basis providing around-the-clock coverage. 
The charts show the number, frequency and sequence of various platoon assign-
ments; the number of tours of duty in a set (number of consecutive days worked 
in a given platoon); the duration, frequency and sequence of swing periods 
(off-duty periods between sets); and the scheduled days on and off, including 
weekends, but excluding individual variables such as vacations and personal 
leave. In 1972, the City promulgated a new squad system (and new duty charts) 
which provided for increased police protection on the third platoon consistent 
with crime fighting needs. Under that system, the number of annual work days 
was reduced to 243, and the work day was increased to 8-1/2 hours. That pro-
cedure was incorporated in the 1972-73 agreement. 
In May 1974, the City proposed to delete from the successor agree-
ment the provisions relating to the new squad system on the ground that the 
subject was not mandatory. Thereupon, the Board of Collective Bargaining (B;CB)of 
OCB decided (Decision B-5-75) that the City must bargain over, 
"...those aspects of duty charts and the 24 squad system 
which affect hours of work, including days of work and 
days off, and which are not fixed by law and which do;not 
impinge on the City's right to determine the level of 
manning required to provide police protection to the 
public." 
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The ensuing negotiations are described in the hearing officer's report and are 
the basis of his determination that the City refused to furnish appropriate 
2 
information and engaged in surface bargaining^ 
On June 6 the City advised PBA that it was asking BCB to appoint 
an impasse panel. Over PBA's objections, the impasse panel was appointed. On 
July 29, 1975, the City informed PBA that it was filing a scope of bargaining 
petition with BCB and it did so on August 8, 1975, one week after the filing 
of the instant charge by PBA. The petition to BCB alleged that the following 
~issues-wrere non-mandatory:—star ting-and-^ 
ferent charts, the number of platoons, the percentage of appearances on each 
platoon, the number of tours in a set and the length and number of swings that 
a policeman receives in a chart cycle. In its ensuing decision (B-24-75), BCB 
determined that the length of the work week was mandatory; all other subjects 
except swing periods it classified as non-mandatory. Swing periods it found to 
be a hybrid subject determined by factoring in the number of days and hours 
worked with managerial decisions on starting times, platoons and levels of 
. 3 
manmngr-
2_ Confirming his findings of fact, we will return to his conclusions of law 
infra. 
_3 Dealing with an argument made by the City that the 1972 squad system 
violated Section 971 of the Unconsolidated Laws by providing for an 8-1/2 
hour work day, BCB concluded that Section 971 did not prohibit a work day of 
more than 8 hours, provided that the tour of actual police field work did 
not exceed 8 hours per day and an average of 40 hours per week. The hearing 
officer agreed. So do we. 
Unconsolidated Laws, Section 971 may, however, have important ramifica-
tions concerning the matters before us. It establishes unique provisions 
and procedures relating to the tours of duty of New York City policemen 
that might distinguish the situation herein from the situation in City of 
White Plains, as reflected in our decision at 5 PERB 3013 (1972) . New York 
City's BCB appears to have reached such a conclusion in its Decision 
B-24-75. It held that Unconsolidated Laws, Section 971, along with the 
management rights clause of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law, 
constitute an implicit prohibition within the meaning of'Board ' of Education 
v. Huntington, 30 NY 2d 122 (1972) as would render a term and condition of 
employment a non-mandatory subject of negotiation. 
4275 
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Although not raised by any of the parties, facts relating to the 
nature of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law and the background of its 
enactment are of concern to us and we take administrative notice of those 
facts. The essential provisions of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law 
were proposed by a tri-partite panel of the Labor-Management Institute of the 
American Arbitration Association on March 31, 1966. Included among the recom-
mendation of" that •tri-partite" panel:were- the substantive" provisions" regaTding^" 
scope of collective bargaining and the procedures for resolving scope of 
bargaining questions by OCB that are now contained in the New York City 
Collective Bargaining Law. The tri-partite panel recommended that OCB should 
administer it by a board consisting of 7 members, two of whom were to be 
appointed by the Mayor, two by a Municipal Labor Committee (MLC) and three 
4 
impartial members to be selected by the Mayor's and MLC's appointees. This 
recommendation, too, has been incorporated into the New York City Collective 
Bargaining Law. PBA was among the participants in the labor committee of the 
tri-partite panel. To this date, it continues as a member of MLC. 
DISCUSSION - SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS 
The City's exceptions posed two challenges to the hearing officer's 
determination that the City erred in asserting that certain matters are not 
mandatory subjects of negotiation. Its major position is that BCB Decision 
B-24-75 is dispositive of the issue and PERB is without jurisdiction to reach 
a contrary conclusion regarding employment that is subject to the New York City 
Collective Bargaining Law. In this, it is supported by OCB. The secondary, or 
fall-back position, is that, in any event, the BCB decision is a correct one and 
should be endorsed by PERB. OCB's arguments in support of this proposition — 
to which PBA properly objects on the ground that intervention was limited to 
h_ The proposal called for the creation of MLC to consist of representatives of 
qualified organizations of City employees which would be a successor to the 
labor committee of the tri-partite panel. 
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the jurisdictional issue — have not been considered by us. 
The position of the City and OCB on the jurisdictional issue is 
that scope of negotiation questions involving employment that is subject to 
the New York City Collective Bargaining Law must be resolved under that law. 
In support of that proposition, the City and OCB argue that CSL Section 212 
authorized the City of New York to enact the New York City Collective Bargaining; 
-L-aw-and-prbvi-ded-that-iLt :and- the -procedures taken- -thereunder--'shall--be- of- -full-----
force and effect unless and until such provisions and procedures, or the con-
tinuing implementation thereof, are found by a court of competent jurisdiction, 
in an action brought by the board in the county of New York for a declaratory 
judgment, not to be substantially equivalent to the provisions and procedures 
set forth in this article [the Taylor Law]." The City and OCB correctly note 
that no action has ever been brought to declare the New York City Collective 
Bargaining Law not substantially equivalent to the Taylor Law. A fortiori, 
there has been no jurisdictional determination to that effect. Moreover, the 
City and OCB point out that the BCB decision B-24-75 was appealed by PBA and 
confirmed by Mr. Justice Hellman of the Supreme Court (Matter of PBA v. BCB, 
NYLJ, January 2, 19 76, p. 6) . 
These are strong arguments, but we are not entirely persuaded by 
them. Scope of negotiations issues are normally resolved in the context of 
improper practice charges alleging refusals to negotiate in good faith. This 
5_ 
is true in the private sector as it is under the Taylor Law. PERB's role in 
resolving scope of negotiation questions in the course of administering CSL 
Section 209-a.l(d) and Section 209-a.2(b) has been confirmed by the New York 
State Court of Appeals (West Irondequoit Teachers v. Helsby, 35 NY 2d 46 [1974]]. 
5 e.g. NLRB v. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
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By the terms of CSL Section 205.5(d), inserted in the Taylor Law in 1969, two 
years after the enactment of CSL Section 212, PERB's responsibilities under 
CSL Section 209-a are exclusive. The legislature recognized that the language 
of CSL Section 205.5(d) would restrict OCB's jurisdiction over scope of nego-
tiation disputes. Each year from 1969 through 1972 it enacted an exception 
to PERB's exclusive jurisdiction to extend for one year only. The last of 
those exceptions lapsed on March 1, 1973-r 
The first of those exceptions was introduced at the request of the Select 
Joint Legislative Committee on Public Employee Relations. That Committee's 
memorandum in support of S 5670 (1969) is set forth in full herewith: 
SENATE 5670 
"AN ACT to amend the civil service law in relation 
to procedures, including those in the city 
of New York, to assist in resolving 
disputes between public employees and 
public employers. 
Purpose of the Bill: 
To exempt the City of New York temporarily from the requirement that the 
Public Employment Relations Board have exclusive and non-delegable juris-
diction over improper employer and employee organization practices. 
Summary of the Bill: 
The bill would provide that the exclusive non-delegable jurisdiction of 
the Public Employment Relations Board with regard to improper public 
employee organization practices, as provided by Chapter 24 of the Laws of 
1969, shall not apply to the City of New York until March 1, 1970. 
Statement in Support of Bill: 
New York City's Office of Collective Bargaining has exercised jurisdiction 
in disputes over the scope of bargaining and over the meaning of the City's 
management rights clause to determine questions of what is bargainable, and 
thus what subjects may go to an impasse panel for its recommendations. 
The recent amendment to the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Taylor 
Law) would preempt OCB's jurisdiction over these matters by giving PERB 
exclusive and non-delegable jurisdiction over improper practices by public 
employers and public employee organizations. 
The recent amendment to the Taylor Law also requires the City to report 
prior to the next Session with regard to certain problems affecting OCB 
believed by some experts to have contributed to strife between the City and 
its employees. Consistent with this approach, the bill would defer changes 
in the scope of OCB's operations by exempting it from PERB's exclusive juris-
diction over improper practices until March 1, 1970. 
By exempting New York City, the bill would ease the burden on PERB with 
regard to the complex problems of implementing the new code of improper 
practices and, thereby, make such implementation more manageable and orderly 
t<C I 
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It is to the Legislature that the City and OCB must turn to insure 
its right to resolve scope of negotiation questions involving employment sub-
ject to the New York City Collective Bargaining Law. We join with the City and 
OCB in urging the enactment of such legislation. Indeed, we first advocated 
giving such jurisdiction to OCB in a Report to the State Legislature on 
December 1, 1969 pursuant to the mandate of June 1969, Chapter 24, to consider 
this ~and" s'everal" other' issues"." Negotiations under'the""New'Yofk City Collective 
Bargaining Law are complicated by unique provisions restricting various manda-
tory subjects of negotiation to different levels of bargaining. In the instant 
case, the situation is further complicated by the provisions of Unconsolidated 
Law, Section 971 that are uniquely applicable to New York City. The resolution 
of scope of negotiations in New York City is best left to OCB, the agency which 
administers those provisions relating to level of bargaining as well as the 
procedures by which impasses are resolved. 
Notwithstanding our reading of the Act as giving us the primary 
jurisdiction over scope of negotiation questions even in New York City, we 
nevertheless find that the hearing officer should have accepted BCB's deter-
]_ 
mination as to the scope of bargaining herein. In reaching this conclusion, 
we rely first upon the singular status granted OCB by the State Legislature in 
Section 212 of the Act, namely, that its establishment does not require a prior 
approval by this Board — a requisite with respect to all other local boards 
throughout the State — rather, the cited section provides, in substance, that 
the New York City Collective Bargaining Law, as enacted by New York City, is 
in full force and effect until there is a determination by the Supreme Court, 
_7 In view of this conclusion, we do not reach the issues posed by the City's 
fall-back position, that the BCB decision is a correct one and should be 
endorsed by us. 
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New York County, that such law is not in substantial equivalency with the State 
law practice and procedures. Secondly, we have noted the unique negotiating 
problems confronting New York City and the expertise of OCB in dealing with 
9. 
such problems. Thirdly, we note the role of PBA in the formulation of the 
New York City Collective Bargaining Law and its membership in MLC, through 
which it shares in the administration of OCB. Finally, we recognize the need 
"of"OCB to "accommodate ""tfo the pr6visx6ns"6f"Sect"i6n""97r of "the"TJn~c~6n"sbTi3aTe^ d"" 
Laws which are uniquely applicable to New York City. Under these circumstances 
there are restrictions upon the opportunities for PBA to seek relief from this 
Board in a matter covered by the New York City Collective Bargaining Law and 
already decided by BCB. Therefore, while we recognize that the test used by 
the hearing officer to decide whether or not to accept BCB's determination on 
scope of negotiations is an appropriate one where this Board defers to an 
arbitrator, we do not apply that test in the instant case. Greater weight 
must be given to a decision of BCB in a case such as this than would be 
10 
accorded to an arbitrator's award. All of the reasons aforesaid oblige us to 
accept the BCB decision on the scope issue in this decision. 
We reverse the decision below insofar as the hearing officer 
determined that the City failed to negotiate in good faith by reason of its 
refusal to negotiate over matters determined by BCB not to be mandatory subjects 
of negotiation. 
J3 Thus, Section 1173-4.3b, "Management Rights" upon which BCB relies in its 
decision B-24-75, is in full force and effect, there being no determination 
to the contrary. 
9^  Matter of Queens Borough Public Library, 8 PERB 3060 (1975). 
10 This is so a. fortiori in the instant case where the BCB decision was 
appealed to and confirmed by the Supreme Court. 
f9ftn 
Board - U-1723 -10 
DISCUSSION - SURFACE BARGAINING AND THE FAILURE TO 
PROVIDE INFORMATION 
Confirming the hearing officer's findings of fact, we also 
confirm his determination that the City violated Section 209-a.l(d) by failing 
to provide information and by engaging in surface bargaining. The hearing 
officer's determination of surface bargaining and failure to provide infor-
:mation._was: not... limited to. those., .issues jwhich..we. now ...find., the. City._..not„obliged_. 
to negotiate about. We accept the hearing officer's reasoning as set forth 
in his opinion. 
DISCUSSION - PREMATURE DECLARATION OF IMPASSE 
We also confirm the hearing officer's findings of fact and con-
clusions of law in connection with his determination that the City did not 
violate CSL Section 209-a.l(d) by declaring an impasse prematurely. In 
reaching this determination we again accept the reasoning contained in the 
hearing officer's opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the City did not 
violate CSL Section 209-a.l(d) by declaring an impasse prematurely or by 
refusing to negotiate about certain demands relating to duty charts, but 
that it did violate that section by engaging in surface bargaining regarding 
aspects of duty charts and work schedules about which it was obliged to 
negotiate and by failing to provide sufficient relevant information to PBA 
during negotiations. 
428. 
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In accordance with our findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and in view of the specific violations of the Act as found, 
11 
IT IS ORDERED that the City negotiate in good faith. 
Dated: New York, New York 
March 25, 1976 
11 Consistent with our Interim Decision, this Order does not contemplate 
cessation of proceedings before the impasse panel. 
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